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medieval thought has exerted a strong infl uence. This omission appears to 
have resulted from the editorial decision to spread discussion of issues in phi-
losophy of religion over various chapters (analogous language in Ashworth, 
the existence of God in Menn, eternity and foreknowledge and necessity in 
Marenbon, creation in Sylla and Dobbs-Weinstein). This was not, in my opin-
ion, a good idea. So important an intersection between medieval and contem-
porary thought as philosophy of religion deserved its own chapter, where the 
reader could readily fi nd an account of medieval treatments not only of the 
topics just mentioned but also of the nature of faith, the divine attributes, the 
problem of evil, and so forth.
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Recent decades have seen a surge of interest in the development of German 
philosophy from Kant to Hegel. A remarkable share of responsibility for this 
rests with Dieter Henrich, whose infl uence stems from his unequaled histori-
cal learning and unfailing philosophical sophistication. In 1973, Henrich gave 
a course of lectures on German idealism at Harvard. David Pacini and others 
transcribed the lectures, Pacini edited the transcripts, and they have now been 
published as Between Kant and Hegel.
Those looking for a broad introduction to Henrich’s approach will fi nd 
one that is both sophisticated and a pleasure to read. Specialists and advanced 
students of German idealism will already be familiar with many of Henrich’s 
insights published elsewhere. And they will be aware of many developments 
that have occurred since 1973, from Henrich’s own later work to important 
alternative accounts of this material. But Henrich’s broad account remains 
both lively and of great continuing importance. Readers of all backgrounds 
will probably agree on one main regret: the lectures get so involved in detailed 
coverage of Fichte’s many revisions to his system that there is insuffi cient space 
left for the later idealists.
The narrative begins with a compelling account of the overall structure 
of Kant’s philosophical system. Henrich stresses Kant’s interest in two press-
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ing and linked problems: justifying the new physical sciences and accounting 
for how metaphysics (though rational in origin) had become mired in unpro-
ductive confl icts. To this end, Kant ventured onto the new philosophical ter-
ritory of his transcendental idealism and the transcendental unity of apper-
ception. Kant thought that the best justifi cation for these new ideas was that 
they enabled a unifi ed solution to the most pressing theoretical problems of 
the day. Similarly, Kant would argue that the idea of our undetermined free-
dom fi t perfectly as a “keystone” unifying this theoretical philosophy with his 
practical account of the moral law; this itself was the best rational justifi ca-
tion for our belief in such freedom, even if we could not directly prove that 
we are free.
On Henrich’s account, Kant’s followers were naturally and under-
standably attracted to new questions and possibilities: Could Kant’s new ideas 
be more directly justifi ed, ideally by a unifi ed set of basic principles? Could 
more be done to ground Kant’s distinction between concept and intuition? 
To explain the nature of the apperceptive subject? To directly justify Kant’s 
concept of freedom, so as to better support the revolutionary impulses of the 
day? True, Kant himself warned — and not without reason — that these ques-
tions would lead back to the forms of metaphysics he had already criticized. 
But Kant’s followers did not simply miss his point. They rather perceived that 
this risk was accompanied by the real possibility of new and important philo-
sophical insights. In this they perceived rightly, on Henrich’s view, even if the 
immediate effect of attention to the new questions was to bring out new dif-
fi culties. Probably the best-known example is Jacobi’s argument that Kant, on 
his own terms, was not at all entitled to employ the concept of the thing-in-
itself. Though resistant to summary, Henrich’s masterful and concise account 
of Jacobi, Reinhold, Schulze, and the complex movements and trends among 
Kant’s early critics and followers is a real highlight of the book.
The narrative then proceeds to Fichte. On Henrich’s extremely infl u-
ential account, Fichte followed Kant’s emphasis on self-consciousness in the 
transcendental deduction, looking for an explanation of self-consciousness 
itself. And he discovered surprising diffi culties and paradoxes. For we would 
ordinarily want to appeal to what Henrich calls the “refl ection theory”: there 
is self-consciousness insofar as a self can turn inward and attend to, or focus 
on, itself. But Fichte realized that any such account presupposes what it means 
to explain. First of all, I can only focus in on something of which I am already 
aware; so attending to myself in this way would require some prior form of self-
awareness. Second, how could the self know that what it focuses on is really 
itself  ? Only with some prior knowledge of what it itself is.
The core of Fichte’s continually developing attempts to articulate an 
alternative account was the famous claim that “the I posits itself.” This means, 
in Henrich’s view, that there can be no distinction between a prior self and 
a subsequent refl ection; rather, “having the self means having it in such a way 
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that there is an awareness of itself ” — an awareness that is active (242 – 43). Hen-
rich argues that this idea fi nally gives Fichte some justifi cation for the founda-
tion of his project: his claim that the self is absolute. I think the crucial ideas 
here are these: No comprehensive philosophy can do without an account of 
our own mental life, including self-consciousness. But how can we account for 
self-consciousness in a way that promises to address the diffi culties and para-
doxes, yet without reducing self-consciousness to something else? Only, Fichte 
proposed, by starting with self-positing. He hoped to account in this way for 
the unity of all of mental life, including mental representation of outer objects 
as independent of the self. So Fichte tried to reconstruct in these terms Kant’s 
account of experience. And he further aimed to reconstruct both Kant’s theo-
retical and practical philosophy on the unifi ed basis of the self-positing self, 
without appeal to any independent thing-in-itself.
Henrich sees Fichte’s criticism of the refl ection theory, leading to his 
insight into the unity of mental life, as a breakthrough of importance compa-
rable to Aristotle’s response to Plato’s ontology (245). But he sees a drawback 
in Fichte’s (continually frustrated) aim to build on this ground a “science” 
akin to “a deductive system” (30 – 31). And there is an obvious worry that Fich-
te’s attempt to deduce his way from the self-positing self to genuinely inde-
pendent objects of experience could never “break the circle of the self’s being 
enclosed in itself ” (223).
Such worries emerged early on and overshadowed Fichte’s later 
revisions to his system. Hölderlin’s response was to try to explain subject, 
object, and their relation all in terms of some higher unifying principle or 
ground — something akin to Spinoza’s substance. Later idealists would fol-
low, trying to defend some of Kant’s insights by reconceiving fundamental 
substance as itself akin to a Kantian free will. Here I think Henrich runs 
out of time, in his fi nal brief sections on Hölderlin and Hegel, leaving ques-
tions unanswered. Are there philosophical reasons for believing this form of 
monism might be true? Does it have philosophical advantages over a retreat 
to orthodox Kantianism? Or did monism just address a hope that the theoreti-
cal and practical problems of the day could be resolved in a single stroke? Or 
perhaps a more basic human aspiration, the “hope that all boundaries can 
be overcome” (86)? Finally, the mature Hegel often criticized the fi gures with 
which Henrich classifi es him — those who advocated a “Spinozism of freedom” 
as a form of a “philosophy of immediacy” — suggesting that there are philo-
sophically salient differences here that merit more consideration.
But it is by no means possible to do justice here to the many insights 
and nuances Henrich was able to fi t into this single course of lectures. That 
this book necessarily ignores recent developments should not distract us from 
what is most important and compelling: the ambitious spirit with which Hen-
rich defends the philosophical signifi cance of the German idealists. He does 
so without trying to reinterpret them to suit the tastes of his audience — with-
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out making concessions to then-dominant suspicions about “metaphysical 
phantasmagoria” (x), as Pacini puts it in the book’s foreword. On Henrich’s 
account, neither Kant nor the later idealists thought that we could become 
simply indifferent to the largest metaphysical questions of the most endur-
ing human interest. In confronting these questions, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel 
each achieved important breakthroughs, opening new approaches and throw-
ing new light on the underlying philosophical terrain. While each approach 
has its costs, Henrich argues that each has enduring philosophical benefi ts as 
well — and each remains open to us for further exploration. Future research 
should, on my view, strive to advance faithfully the ambitious spirit of Hen-
rich’s account — even if this might sometimes end up leading beyond the letter 
of what Henrich himself had to say in 1973.
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Although Dieter Henrich is well known as one of the deans of Kant scholarship 
and a leading expert in German Idealism, his systematic philosophical work 
has not received much attention, at least not in the English-speaking world. 
This is the fi rst book-length exposition and appraisal of Henrich’s systematic 
philosophy of subjectivity in the English language.
Chapter 1 situates Henrich’s work within the philosophical terrain. 
Freundlieb presents Henrich’s philosophy of subjectivity as steering between 
the Scylla of “analytic philosophy” and the Charybdis of “continental philoso-
phy” by combining the best features of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The 
alleged problem of many strands of analytic philosophy is their commitment to 
naturalism and lack of existential, cultural, and political relevance. The major 
problem of continental philosophy (especially of the hermeneutic school and 
postmodernism), according to Freundlieb, is the excessive focus on language 
at the expense of nonlinguistic phenomena. Contrary to most analytic philoso-
phers, Henrich argues that a thoroughgoing naturalism is impossible because 
subjectivity, properly understood, cannot be captured by a physicalist account 
of the world. And in opposition to the majority of continental philosophers, 
